Latest Posts

It’s Not the Racquet (Or the Copper Wire) A View From Across the Net The Code, Principle 19: Touching the Net or Opponent’s Court Three Players, Two Servers: A Smarter Tennis Warm-Up Tennis Beyond the Headlines: November 16, 2026 2,513 Days of Tennis Blogging: A Reflection on Consistency The Consistency of Expectations

Last Friday evening, I was supposed to fly home from the USTA National Women’s Intersectional Team Championships in Fort Lauderdale. Unfortunately, my travel plans were among the many disrupted by the nationwide air traffic control (ATC) ground stop. I got caught up in the rolling wave of flight cancellations that kept me from making it home until midnight on Sunday/Monday morning.

The extended stay wasn’t entirely unpleasant. I wound up spending quality time with a few members of the 75s Texas team, since one of them was on my flight. That being said, I would have preferred to spend the weekend at home.

I work in aviation cybersecurity and cyber resiliency. Consequently, I have been consuming public information about what caused the ATC outage with rapt attention. While I deal almost exclusively with the military side of that domain, I occasionally cross over into the commercial space. However, I want to be clear that I know next to nothing about the FAA ATC system, although this post contains some well-informed speculation. Additionally, I need to make it clear that the views in this blog post are mine and mine alone and do not represent any official position of my current employer.

My official job title is a “Fellow” specializing in cyber risk assessment. In a nutshell, my job is to give people advice… which is frequently ignored. In the past six years since I was originally awarded the fellowship, I have been increasingly spending time on projects centered around cyber resiliency and cyber systems engineering. As it turns out, it is a short distance between knowing what can go wrong in systems and leveraging that insight into how to do better.

2027 will be my last year out in the workforce. Ever since I firmed up the date, my company’s priority for my time has been investing in the education of engineers and developers on how to architect, design, and support cyber-resilient aircraft. In one of my classes, I use the FAA’s January 2023 NOTAM outage, an event that resulted in another nationwide ground stop, as an example in a course I teach on secure aviation design. I’m fairly certain this latest incident will make its way into a few charts as well.

As I fight through the partisan finger-pointing, excuses, and explanations emerging from the FAA and other government officials on last weekend’s ground stop, some genuinely useful nuggets of information have emerged. I am particularly annoyed at the insinuation that old technology is to blame for this latest failure. To put it bluntly, copper wire is not inherently any less resilient than fiber-optic cable. 

While there are legitimate reasons to modernize the ATC infrastructure, the emphasis on copper wire is misguided. To invoke a tennis analogy, it is like a player blaming poor stroke mechanics and bad footwork on their tennis racquet. A better racquet might improve some aspects of a player’s performance, but it won’t correct fundamental technical deficiencies. Likewise, replacing copper with fiber might improve the throughput and capacity of the ATC network, but it won’t address the architectural weaknesses responsible for failures of cyber resiliency.

According to the FAA’s preliminary explanation, excessive network traffic destabilized legacy telecommunications equipment, producing cascading failures that affected air traffic control facilities across much of the country. Investigators identified two possible sources, including a facility in Arkansas where a new router had been installed.

If that router was responsible for the increased traffic, it’s entirely possible that the new equipment was functioning exactly as designed. The problem is more likely that other network components couldn’t handle the additional traffic.

When upgrading a legacy system, engineers need to understand the limitations of the existing architecture. If the new router was responsible for the increased traffic, limiting its output to levels the network could accommodate might have prevented the problem. I don’t know enough about the FAA’s architecture to say that would have worked, but introducing new technology without considering its systemic implications is inadvisable.

Cascading failures are the hallmark of brittle systems. A resilient system architecture should detect, contain, and recover from disruptions without letting a localized problem spread nationwide. Changing the speed of the networks won’t fix any of those root-cause issues. In fact, this weekend pretty much showed that the ATC network doesn’t need more speed, but rather more mechanisms to recognize and respond to overload.

I was also very annoyed at the speculation that the outage may have been a cyberattack. In this case, my confident opinion is that it was not, but my reason for thinking that is hardly reassuring. If it had been, I believe the outage would have been much worse. So while it wasn’t an attack by a malicious adversary, the weaknesses are relevant to cybersecurity and resiliency. A brittle, unresilient system is one that can be obliterated by simply triggering existing architectural weaknesses, rather than exquisite zero-days. 

There are important lessons to be learned from this incident. Unfortunately, I am pessimistic about the prospects of  the public discourse and private investigations drawing the right conclusions.  Replacing aging equipment is an appealing response because it’s relatively easy to implement and the results are visible. Addressing architectural weaknesses, identifying hidden dependencies, and developing mechanisms to detect and contain failures are considerably more complicated. They’re also less likely to generate sensational headlines.

Modernization has its place, but I’d much rather see a concerted effort to architect a resilient ATC network rather than a blind rush to replace old technology and infrastructure.

Just as the problem with your tennis performance isn’t your racquet,  the root cause issue with the ATC system isn’t the copper wire.

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *