Ratings management in competitive tennis is the practice of intentional performance modification to create an edge. One way that might be done is by players selectively choosing which matches to play. Another (albeit much less ethical) method is to modulate effort, in essence choosing when to play well… or poorly. Either way, ratings management is a strategic, intentional attempt to create a competitive advantage.
While ratings management is widespread in both Junior and Adult tennis, how it is performed is dramatically different between those two populations. Both groups are incentivized and motivated by the ratings system that governs their play. However, Juniors compete in a single continuum focused on achieving high performance. Adults compete in a tiered system with arbitrary dividing lines between discrete levels. This is a real challenge for a universal ratings system such as the ITF/USTA World Tennis Number (WTN), which is supposed to work seamlessly across both populations of players. It is also a difference that anyone attempting to create competitive frameworks that work for both Adults and Juniors also needs to understand.
In Junior tennis, the competitive framework is built around a continuous push toward ever-higher levels of performance. The pathway is designed to reward progression, with the ultimate marker of success being a professional career… or at least collegiate recruitment. In Junior tennis, ratings (and rankings) are tangible proof of a player’s achievement within the competitive hierarchy. As a result, Juniors are heavily incentivized not to improve their actual performance but more specifically, their rating.
One common way Juniors manage their ratings is through curated tournament selection. On the positive side, they try to find events where they are likely to face opponents that will improve their rating if they win without being exposed to potential “bad losses” against someone who is rated below them. Ratings management has become a real problem in Junior tennis, precipitated first by the public visibility of UTR and now WTN. Players (and their coaches and parents) study tournament entry lists and draw sheets and have no compunctions over withdrawing from events at the last minute if the field isn’t favorable.
A rule prohibits players from entering two overlapping USTA tournaments. However, there is no restriction on entering concurrent USTA and UTR events held at the same time. Since a person cannot be in two places simultaneously, anytime that happens it is a pretty good indication that ratings management is going on. Essentially, the player waits to choose whichever tournament offers more benefits and less risk to their rating at the last minute. While it might be tempting to think of that practice as smart, it comes with terrible consequences for other players, the competitive ecosystem, and even the ratings-managed players themselves.
Players trying to improve their WTN number must necessarily play someone rated close to or higher than their current rating. However, if all prospective opponents who can provide that opportunity withdraw from the tournament rather than risk losing a head-to-head matchup, the player is stuck. Worse, since draw sizes are strictly limited in the higher tier tournaments and selection is based on WTN number, a player who cannot improve their WTN rating cannot get into those events. Even once those players get into a draw, withdrawals are chronic, particularly in the consolations.
That reality particularly disadvantages players from smaller tennis markets who don’t have the opportunity to play in many (or any) big tournaments in their local area. Getting waitlisted for an event and then being granted entry hours before play begins is no big deal to a local player, but it is an insurmountable obstacle for a someone who lives 8 hours away. Sometimes the players from outlying areas get into the draw, make the drive, and then sit around the tournament as their prospective opponents withdraw right and left. Those players are doing everything right, but the the tennis competitive ecosystem seems to be conspiring to prevent them from playing the matches that will help improve their competitive level, win or lose.
One of the most difficult skills for players to master in tennis is learning how to consistently win matches they’re supposed to win. Beating a lower-rated opponent, especially when everyone expects it, is really hard. There is no greater pressure than pulling out the win in a winnable match. It’s easy to get tight, play passively, or spiral when a so-called “weaker” opponent plays loose and fearless. Yet, this is exactly the type of performance mastery competitive players must develop to succeed at the highest levels.
Junior players who engage heavily in ratings management stunt their own competitive growth. By refusing to put their rating on the line, they miss the opportunity to build the mental toughness required to close out matches, handle being the favorite, and compete under the weight of expectation. Those skills are essential at the collegiate and professional levels.
The challenge for the USTA is that enforcing punitive measures against this type of ratings manipulation is extraordinarily difficult. Proving intent behind withdrawals or selective scheduling is murky at best, and the organization is notoriously risk-averse when it comes to the potential for lawsuits from players or parents claiming unfair treatment. Any attempt to discipline players for strategic withdrawals or dual tournament entries could quickly spiral into legal battles the USTA has little appetite to fight.
As a result, the most effective “lever” to pull may not be punishment at all but rather rethinking the incentive structures that currently rewards ratings management. If the system was better aligned to benefit the players who exhibit the competitive habits the sport should be cultivating, the competitive tennis ecosystem would most certainly become better.
One option is creating and maintaining a second metric in addition to pure performance ratings. For the rest of this post, I am going to call this the “CS” factor. (What that stands for is left as an exercise to the reader.) Without penalizing players for excessive withdrawals, defaults, and mid-match retirements, the CS factor is a secondary yardstick for measuring performance. It is a metric to capture how frequently players systematically duck tough competition. Collegiate coaches would certainly want to know if the player they were recruiting didn’t have the confidence to play matches they were afraid they might lose. While those coaches could theoretically pull player records and see the pattern themselves, they don’t. The CS metric would make it easier to quantify that behavior.
The CS factor could be taken a step further and used in combination with performance ratings for selection into tournaments. For example, perhaps the first 50% of draw spots could be awarded strictly on the WTN rating. The remaining half of the draw could be selected based on a combination of the pure performance rating and the CS factor. In other words, if a player had a high WTN but also a high CS factor, indicating frequent withdrawals and ducking competition, that could hurt them to the point that a player with a lower WTN might be accepted over them. That would change player behavior in a hurry.
The USTA’s challenge is that enforcing punitive measures against ratings manipulation is extraordinarily difficult. Proving intent behind withdrawals or selective scheduling is murky at best, and the organization is notoriously risk-averse regarding potential lawsuits from players or parents claiming unfair treatment. As a result, the most effective approach may not be punishment at all, but rather rethinking the incentive structures that currently reward ratings management. A better competitive framework could shift behavior toward the habits the sport should be promoting.
While it’s been over a decade since I have had a Junior player in my household — and much has changed in that time — it’s impossible to talk to anyone on that side of the sport today without coming to the conclusion that Junior tennis is broken. At the heart of that dysfunction is how the incentive system is structured. Public ratings like UTR and (now) WTN have indelibly changed the competitive landscape. That genie can never be put back in the bottle. Parents, coaches, and players are responding rationally to the competitive environment the USTA has created. The problems cannot be fixed by pretending that the world hasn’t changed. Instead, the USTA must figure out how to refine the competitive framework to work within this new reality rather than denying it exists.
Tomorrow, I’ll turn my attention to Adult tennis. Player ratings management becomes an entirely different beast once Junior tennis ends. The motivations of adults are driven by different considerations. This is important to understand, because systemic decisions made in Junior tennis are frequently applied wholesale to Adult competition. Often that comes without consideration of the unique differences between the two groups.
The bottom line is this: Junior tennis isn’t broken because players are bad actors — it’s broken because the system rewards behavior that undermines true competitive development. Any serious effort to fix it has to start by rethinking the incentives.
